Guyana's state media

Guyana's state media: the quest for control
guyanacaribbeanpolitics.com

by David A Granger - Originally posted in Stabroek News June 18th.2000

The Union of Guyanese Journalists (UGJ) published a pamphlet edited by Moses Nagamootoo - Paramountcy over the Guyana Media: A case for Reform - in which it described "editors and directors" of the state media as labouring "under the command of party tzars and old-guard Burnhamite hatchetmen". Journalists attached to the state media were said to have developed "a second nature precautionary inclination for self-censorship which destroys professionalism and independent critical thinking."

Citing free mass media as "indispensable to democratisation and development", the pamphlet announced the PPP-Civic's pledge "to remove all party political control over the media; "maintain no government or State monopoly over the media ... [and] make the state-owned media autonomous". That was in April 1992, six months before the PPP-Civic entered office.

The replacement of the heads of the state-owned Guyana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC); Guyana National Newspapers Ltd's (GNNL) Chronicle newspaper; Guyana Television Broadcasting Company (GTV); and Guyana Public Communications Agency (GPCA) shortly after the PPP-C assumed office in October 1992 was to be expected.

The PPP-Civic Administration also found it fitting to re-establish the Information Ministry which had been abandoned even by the PNC as both undesirable and unnecessary in an age of communication freedom.

The dissolution of the quasi-commercial GPCA was recommended in Rafiq Khan's Towards Media Restructuring in Guyana: A Report to the Government of Guyana (1993). In its place, the GIS - first created by the British to bolster support for the Government - was re-established for a similar purpose. In effect, it became clear that the PPP administration's policy towards the state media was much as it had been for the previous 50 years.

The colonial GIS and its Bulletin set a precedent for active state participation in the media and the deliberate insertion of a 'gate' to regulate the flow of information to the populace. The lesson has never been lost

Hearts and minds

Guyana's state-centred media communications policies over the last 40 years by PPP and PNC administrations may have had their origins in the decision by Sir Gordon Lethem, the British Governor of the Colony, to establish the Bureau of Publicity and Information (BPI) on 1 August 1942 while World War II was in progress.

Intended as an emergency war-time measure, the BPI's mission was to encourage the populace to become self-sufficient through the 'Grow More Food Campaign' rather than to rely on imports. The reason for this was that German U-Boats had launched hostile operations against Allied shipping on the Northern South American coast to stop supplies of bauxite being shipped from the mines of Guyana and Suriname to North America, and to prevent food from reaching the colonies which produced little of their own.

The BPI published a Bulletin which was circulated, gratis, as a supplement in the private Sunday newspapers. BPI also served as an agency for the distribution of UK Government official literature and conducted publicity campaigns, press relations, public relations and public opinion surveys.

After the War, the BPI languished for lack of funds but things would soon change. In October 1953, less than six months after the April elections, the UK Government expelled the democratically-elected ministers of the original PPP, suspended the constitution, sent in troops and installed an interim administration. These steps were taken on the grounds that, inter alia, the PPP ministers were communist and had placed the colony in jeopardy.

Since the 'original' PPP had genuine popular support among the masses, and resistance to the British was being encouraged, the UK Government decided that it would have to fight for the hearts and minds of the populace. A British minister declared that "The Government of British Guiana must also do its share through information services in proclaiming the ideals and aims of parliamentary democracy on a non-party basis."

As a result, a British public relations adviser, R.L. Young, was sent to advise on the expansion of the BPI's work and, particularly, to counteract the 'communist threat'. Among other changes, the Bulletin was augmented from 10,000 to a fully-fledged, weekly newspaper with circulation of 30,000. The BPI, now renamed Government Information Service (GIS), then embarked on a campaign of hostile poaching of the best reporters and sub-editors from the private press for the Bulletin's staff.

A new PR adviser, A. J. Hockenhull, was subsequently sent to Guyana. He proposed a three-dimensional campaign employing the press, radio broadcasts and movies to deliver the state's message. From a post-war budget of BWI $29,000, the Legislative Council (then without elected representatives) was asked to provide $750,000 for the battle to win the 'hearts and minds' of the Guyanese populace, away from the original PPP.

The Bulletin was a professionally-produced paper, targeted at the rural districts where the majority of the PPP's Indian-Guyanese supporters lived. It was not overtly partisan; rather, it subtly emphasized the achievements of the rural development initiatives being undertaken by the state in comparison to what the party (i.e., PPP) had to offer. Circulation was pushed to 52,000, the highest for any publication in Guyana. Describing his work, PR adviser Hockenhull, said, "This is [a] mighty human relations job, not news gathering." The colonial GIS and its Bulletin set a precedent for active state participation in the media and the deliberate insertion of a 'gate' to regulate the flow of information to the populace. The lesson has never been lost.

Gatekeepers

Both the present PPP and PNC parties grew out of the 'original' PPP which saw itself as the victim of the UK's state media policy. By the time Guyana became independent in 1966, the PNC administration was able to inherit the same colonial Government Information Service (GIS) apparatus, already equipped to appeal directly to public opinion, but found itself surrounded by a powerful, privately-owned press. Less than a decade later, the state was to become the biggest player in the mass media field.

The state's first step in its march to a near monopoly in the media was the creation of a Ministry of Information in 1967, the aim of which was: "To provide sound, reliable and credible informational, developmental and political support for effective government and to satisfy the information needs of the Guyanese people both locally and overseas."

Three years later, the GIS had all but crumpled under the burgeoning ministerial bureaucracy with four new, fully-staffed divisions - Press, Publications, Films & Photographs and a Field Division - equipped with mobile units to travel to rural and hinterland communities.

The acquisition of newspapers and the radio station came next. These were eventually to be centralized under two newly-created state corporations - the Guyana National Newspapers Ltd (GNNL) for newspapers and the Guyana Broadcasting Corporation (GBC) for radio. Finally, a state advertising agency - Design and Graphics - and a Film Centre were added, the latter eventually evolving into the Guyana Television Broadcasting Company (GTV).

Despite the installation of boards of management for these corporations, the fact was that all their members were state appointees and could be hired and fired at will by the politicians who controlled the state apparatus. This was made abundantly clear in the case of the GNNL - publishers of the Chronicle newspaper - which replaced eight editors-in-chief in its first 12 years of state ownership!

The growing corps of emigre Guyanese - especially dismissed ex-journalists such as Ulric Mentus, Rickey Singh and Hubert Williams, all formerly of the independent Guyana Graphic newspaper - continued to be critical of events in Guyana

By the mid-1970s, the state was in control of the greater part of the economy, but soon thereafter, the economy went into a slump, social problems multiplied, industrial and political unrest spread and resistance to the PNC increased; criticism of the conduct of the administration went beyond the country's borders. The growing corps of emigre Guyanese - especially dismissed ex-journalists such as Ulric Mentus, Rickey Singh and Hubert Williams, all formerly of the independent Guyana Graphic newspaper - continued to be critical of events in Guyana.

The general elections of 1973, the Sophia Declaration of 1974, the Dayclean case of 1976, the referendum of 1978, the Jonestown massacre of 1978, and the murder of Fr Bernard Darke in 1979, for example, became the foci of scathing commentary by the foreign press, but little was published or broadcast by the state media to contradict the official line on these issues.

The Caribbean News Agency (CANA) was part of the international media community which came to be seen as hostile to the administration. A product of the debate on the New International Information Order (NIIO) which Guyana supported, CANA was now accused of "... unforgivable slanders against the Government of Guyana" and "failing to fulfil its mandate".

In 1980, therefore, Guyana decided to establish its own Guyana News Agency (GNA) and to withdraw from CANA. From the start, it was obvious that the administration's intention was to control the flow of information to the public. The GNA was charged with responsibility for:

* Channelling overseas news to the local media, government leaders and other decision-makers, and other relevant publics, in Guyana and, through its missions overseas, to the relevant publics outside Guyana;

* Gathering information about developments in Guyana - particularly in areas outside the city - and disseminating same to the Guyanese people in the form of news and feature articles, etc., via the print and broadcast media;

* Providing an editing service, eventually, for overseas materials, to give them a Third World orientation and make them more meaningful to the Guyanese readership.

The administration's clear aim was to make the GNA the ultimate gatekeeper, with a virtual monopoly over information entering, or emanating from, the country.

In order to train sufficient personnel to staff this growing state media empire, the Ministry of Information had entered into an agreement with the University of Guyana (UG) to conduct a Diploma in Public Communications Course (DPC) from 1975. Initially, the modest aims of the course were: "To upgrade the skills and educational breadth of persons who were already working in the mass media but had no formal training", and "To prepare a cadre of professional communicators... to use appropriate media to assist in the Government of Guyana development thrust."

The resources for conducting such training, however, were inadequate. Over the years, the building fell into disrepair, the library holdings were "extremely limited and woefully out-of-date... academic and trade periodicals virtually non-existent"; heavy emphasis was placed on classroom, compared to practical, work with an equal balance between professional and non-professional courses. Inevitably, too, most of the participants were drawn from the state media and returned there after graduating. In 1990, without apparent significant improvement in resources, a bachelor's degree programme was offered. Since this was the only formal media training programme in Guyana, priority was given to the selection of state-employed journalists who inculcated the dominant pro-state media doctrine.

As Guyana struggled to climb out of the economic depression of the 1980s, it was obliged to reduce the number of ministries in the government and to begin privatizing those parts which were loss-making or were considered not necessary to public administration. The Ministry of Information was closed but what took its place was neither fish nor fowl - neither fully state nor sufficiently private.

The Guyana Public Communications Agency (GPCA), a quasi-autonomous body, took over the same offices previously used by the Ministry and, it seemed, inherited the same relationships that were built up with the state media which had further expanded to include television (GTV). The GPCA was really an attempt by the state to make the managing of information more efficient or profitable, or both; certainly it was not to make it more independent.

According to Christopher Nascimento, its first Director, the GPCA's role was: "To disseminate factual information about the country, its government, its people and its progress; to promote and enhance the image of the country, and to support specific development projects and activities by providing an information link between project planners and those intended to benefit from the plan, in other words, Development Support Communication."

Newspeak

"Development Support Communication," said Guyana's one-time Information Minister Frank Campbell:

... simply means using the communication media ... to help to ensure the success of development projects and programmes; to help to ensure that the people who have to plan, execute, benefit from, or even suffer from a particular project or programme, all understand what is involved, all understand the importance of considering the interests and problems of the other, and all are as fully involved as is necessary to overcome whatever problems may arise and to achieve the success and the objective of the project."

In reality, the meaning of Development Support Communication (DSC) was far from that simple, the people to whom it was targeted far from involved, and the projects and programmes it promoted far from successful, in the 30 years or so since it has been made the doctrine of the state media in Guyana.

DSC was Guyana's interpretation and application of the New International Information Order (NIIO), or the New World Information Order (NWIO), that became the rage in the 1970s. The NIIO was an attempt to define a communication model for the distribution of global information parallel to the economic model of global resource distribution.

The existing 'Old International Information Order' (OIIO) was seen as a legacy of colonial domination by Western Europe and North America over the poorer countries of the South. Through their ownership of the 'big four' news agencies - Agence France Presse, Associated Press, Reuters and United Press International - with their enormous technological, financial and strategic advantages, the world's communication resources were unequally distributed. Monopolistic and multinational ownership created a 'one way flow' of information to the developing countries which lacked the 'capacity to make their voices heard.'

The Non-Aligned Movement's (NAM) collective policy in this regard was complemented by UNESCO's efforts. Together, the UNESCO Declaration on the Mass Media; the McBride Commission Report; and the International Programme for the Development of Communication formed the 'core' of the developing countries' efforts to alter the international distribution of information resources in their favour, efforts which were influenced, at the national level, by Wilbur Schramm's, path-breaking Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in Developing Countries, which suggested a transcendental role for the media.

In the throes of restructuring its international relations and taking control of the 'commanding heights' of the domestic economy, The PNC administration embraced the New Information Order zealously. Abroad, Guyana's membership of the Inter-Governmental Council for the Coordination of Information among Non-Aligned countries, CARICOM and UNESCO presented fora for active advocacy for change. At home, DSC became the dominant media doctrine and the core of teaching on mass communication programmes at the university.

Development communication came to be regarded as an integral part of transforming a poor country into a prosperous one. Like governments in many developing countries, Guyana seemed to believe that, if the media were to be employed in the execution of economic projects, "the [s]tate would have to control them."

The inevitable results were that traditional ideals of democracy and press independence became casualties of the new thinking. States rationalized their media policies by arguing that they needed time 'to catch up' with developed countries; that criticism should be minimized in order to create a climate of stability; and the media should co-operate by emphasizing 'positive' development-inspired news rather than 'negative' oppositionist news.

The result, as John Lent pointed out, was a clash of two value systems: the press as 'watchdog' of the government vs the press as the 'tool' of officialdom. In the latter role, the press loses its independence.

In Guyana, the new news was received coolly by a sceptical populace. The state media's 'development news' focused attention on economic projects while 'protocol news' dealt with many diplomatic events which seemed to be of little interest to, and made less impact on the lives of, the readers. For example, state media now felt obliged to give detailed accounts of the speeches and activities of government leaders, foreign visits, observances of birth anniversaries of socialist leaders and the exchange of greetings among leaders, all seen as part of 'national development'.

Inevitably, in the course of time, the state media lost their effectiveness even as a tool for development. Guyanese readers, viewers and listeners came to regard them merely as the purveyors of irrelevant information and as apologists for the administration. Not surprisingly, the public turned to other sources for what they thought would be credible news and it was to suppress those sources that the state applied its strength and resourcefulness.

Turn of the screw

Despite the thoroughness of the nationalization programmes of the early 1970s by the Government of Guyana, a few small newspapers survived. Several legalistic and bureaucratic measures had to be employed by the state to attempt to cajole them into conformity or clobber them into closure.

In the immediate post-Independence period, the Guyana Graphic, owned by the Thompson group, had been the strongest independent newspaper in Guyana. The purchase of the Chronicle by the state in 1971 was aimed initially, at challenging the Graphic, the largest circulation newspaper.

The Graphic's strident criticism of the PNC administration over the manipulation of the election results in July 1973 led to the sacking of the Sunday Editor Ulric Mentus, and the resignations of journalists Rickey Singh and Hubert Williams from that newspaper, and to the removal of Fr Harold Wong as Editor of the Catholic Standard, all presumably, under pressure from the administration.

The following year, the state bought the Graphic and combined its resources to publish the Daily Chronicle and the evening Citizen newspapers. That was the end of criticism from that quarter! The policy of sacking errant editors of the Chronicle continued throughout state ownership.

The second means of control was dispensing advertising revenue. The administration inadvertently precipitated a serious financial catastrophe as a consequence of its political ideology and economic naivete. As it was moving to exert greater control over the press, it promulgated Guyana's Draft Second Development Plan, 1972-1976 which aimed, as its autarkical objective, to 'feed, clothe and house' the population by the end of the plan period, 1976. The plan involved first, a deliberate programme of reducing the volume of food products, and other commodities entering the country, with the expectation that the local production would expand to satisfy the market. And second, a decision to control commerce and banking, directly, by the establishment of the External Trade Bureau (ETB) and the Guyana National Cooperative Bank (GNCB) and a number of other financial institutions. The ETB was meant to be the main national importer, distributing commodities nationally to other suppliers. The GNCB was meant to be the main commercial bank, thereby miniaturizing all others.

It so happened that these measures resulted in the drastic reduction of the volume of advertising revenue flowing to the media simply because there were fewer goods, less competition among agents, and much of what was imported was readily snapped up by consumers.

What started as idealistic policy soon became a frantic necessity. The oil shocks of the 1970s caused by the decision of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to reduce petroleum supplies and increase prices forced Guyana 'to further restrict imported items in order to conserve foreign exchange to pay for their petroleum products.'

The growing state-owned sector, augmented by the programme of nationalization, created virtual monopolies which hardly needed to advertise; when they did, it was more for prestige than for profit. In addition, State advertising was channelled through Design & Graphics, a state-owned enterprise which did not pursue advertising as aggressively within the closed Guyana State Corporation (GUYSTAC) group of companies as it might have had to do in a free market.

By 1976, even in the face of falling advertising revenues, the state decided to impose a ban on 'advertising for certain goods and services which were still available in the country', including the few remaining foreign-owned commercial banks.

A group of experts attempted to advise that, in the absence of advertising revenue, the state would have to meet the capital costs for its expanding media empire. But the group's proposed 'Advertising Code' was never fully implemented.

The result of this sequence of events was that, in the long term, the revenue shortfall meant that the acquisition of new equipment, training of staff and expansion of services in the state media ceased.

The administration also used governmental advertising as a form of patronage and punishment, favouring its own newspaper - the Chronicle, and that of the ruling PNC party, the New Nation - and denying advertisement to the opposition press, namely, the Mirror, Catholic Standard and Dayclean newspapers.

When the PPP-C went into office in 1992, similarly, state advertisements went principally to the state-owned Chronicle and the PPP newspaper, the Mirror. The editor of the independent Stabroek News was obliged to complain of this discriminatory practice.

Media and politics

There were great expectations among Guyanese media, when the PPP returned to office in 1992, that the pledge in its Time for Change, Time to Rebuild Elections 1992 Manifesto would be honoured. The party had promised, among other things:

* no government or state monopoly over the media;

* a guarantee of private ownership in keeping with a pluralist democracy and freedom of the media;

* opening the media to different shades of opinion.

After five years in office, however, those promises failed to materialise and guarantees were dropped. The party's next manifesto for the 15 December 1997 elections, Consolidating Democracy and Unity for Continuous Progress, ignored the issues of ownership and control completely, choosing to emphasise the importance of long-term legislation and training instead.

What became evident was that, once it inherited the extensive state media empire from the PNC administration, the PPP-C was 'unwilling to spit out the juicy morsel that good fortune had placed in its mouth' (as the African proverb goes).

To a certain degree, the hostile attitude to private media displayed by the PNC administration (1964 - 1992) was only the continuation of the conduct of the PPP Administration (1957 - 1964). While in office, Dr Cheddi Jagan as Premier, and leader of the PPP, had banned the editors of the Guiana Times and Chronicle from attending his press conferences in 1961 and 1962 respectively, and terminated state subscriptions and advertising in the then privately-owned Chronicle. The PPP administration also threatened to establish a Press Council with statutory powers to control the press - a threat which was criticized by the Caribbean Press Association.

The PPP administration felt that it received a bad press in its day. Both the privately-owned Graphic and Chronicle newspapers severely criticized the budget in February 1962 with hysterical headlines such as 'Budget of Tears'; 'Slave Whip Budget'; 'Government to Squeeze Dollars from Workers', and the ensuing protests had contributed to a major riot and arson in Georgetown.

The Graphic also claimed to have exposed the PPP administration's plan to take a large loan from the Guyana Import-Export Corporation (GIMPEX), the PPP trading arm, and the Chronicle ran an expose on the funding of the PPP by the USSR. On 31 March 1964, the editor of the Evening Post and Sunday Argosy, another critic of the PPP administration, was shot, an act that was to be a grim portent of the stabbing of Fr Bernard Darke 15 years later, under the PNC administration.

It is not surprising that, once the PPP was returned to office in 1992, it would be in no hurry to divest the state media especially its monopoly over radio. It was also just a matter of time before state and party criticisms would be directed against the independent press.

The Stabroek News, in particular, was dubbed 'anti-national' and 'unpatriotic'; subsequently, its editor had to complain that lucrative state advertising was being withheld. Mrs Janet Jagan, at that time still the editor of the Mirror newspaper, suddenly discovered an 'anti-government cabal' amongst the press.

Over the past 30 years, the state apparatus for the control of the media has been strengthened deliberately by institutional measures and ideological policies. Although some independent media persevered, the domination of the state media remains unchanged, though not unchallenged, despite a change in the party in power.

One major reason for the retention of control over the media in Guyana is the cyclical electoral contest mainly between the PPP and PNC, and the incumbent party's reliance on the state media for sheer propaganda. This became evident in the PPP's employment of the state's three media corporations in the December 1997 elections.

More than two weeks before the December elections, the Electoral Assistance Bureau (EAB) declared that, rather than being passive purveyors of information to the electorate, media houses had become 'propaganda' instruments of the respective political campaigns.

The EAB's report claimed that the three state-owned media houses - GNNL (newspaper), GTV (television) and GBC (radio) - were displaying varying levels of bias (88, 60 and 78 per cent, respectively) towards the People's Progressive Party-Civic (PPP-C) administration in its coverage of news. A week later, on December 9, an EAB news release accused the state's Guyana Information Services (GIS) of "abuse", charging that it was "advancing the cause of the ruling party."

The political rivalry between the two major parties and the need to employ the state's resources to support their elections campaigns seem to be the main reasons why state ownership of the media in Guyana still persists.